Military-Civilian Cooperation

Western Military actors can significantly assist the effective delivery of goods and services in humanitarian crises and in many circumstances, they have the potential to provide protection to civilians. What are the potential disadvantages for humanitarian NGOs and UN Agencies of close cooperation with western armed forces? How should humanitarian organisations structure their relationships with these actors in complex political emergencies?

Introduction

Over the past century, Humanitarian actors have worked in complex emergencies around the world. The mandates of these organisations however, often intersect with the interests of sovereign states. How this interaction occurs, varies across a large spectrum. Often, the umbrella of operations for the military in this context, is known as stability (DoD, 2016).

However, in a war context, such operational capability for service restoration is often limited to the affected State, of which the military is often a key actor. In this, many civilian/state resources, are not able to be utilised due to security, capability or capacity issues (Abiew, 2003a; DoD, 2016). Natural disasters however, often include these actors, who in many developed States have emergency response plans which can contribute as required. An example of some of the requirements that can be found in different types of disasters is shown below (Wiharta, et al, 2008).

“The intense field experience of the past few years has tended to reveal the fact that effectiveness of contemporary peace operations will depend on the collaboration of military and civilian actors” (Abiew, 2003a).

Abiew’s view regarding NGO-military relations, especially in stability operations highlighted the unease in collaboration. Across this broad-spectrum of operations, lies the unenviable task of coordination; where principles are often traded for resources, and control is traded for assistance (Allison & Blackwill, 2000). The interests of many Western Governments have played significant roles in many major crises we face today (Herman, 2017). Yet, the humanitarian community, can no doubt leverage significant effects; especially when working with western militaries. The distinction of war, development and emergency operations often defines the intent of States, as the strategic and operational objectives of Government flows onto ground operations. In it’s very essence, the military is an extension of policy (Sukman, 2016).

​The purpose of this paper is to then explore an example, of a complex-emergency; the disadvantages for humanitarian actors and likely risks associated with western military collaboration. There is a large body of literature, however certain areas need further research; specifically, to highlight some of the considerations that are currently deficient when operating in different settings.

Development and War-fighting

The purpose of any military is foundational/complex war-fighting. To fight on behalf of Governments, whilst mitigating the effects on local indigenous populations. Yet a commitment to war, is often intrinsically tied with a commitment to redevelopment; not only to restore, but often to enhance the quality and way of life. This has become clear, in many recent conflicts, especially in the middle-east (Herman, 2017; ECOSOC, 2017).

The purpose of the military than transitions into development or “stability” operations, which often focuses on the restoration of services/infrastructure. To do this, logistical assets can be drawn upon, with many Western militaries having access to a repository of resources (ECOSOC, 2017; Reiterer, 2015).

Concurrent activity will continue, as no society can exist without security. When law and order doesn’t exist, then the social-fabric of a community will be under threat and will never be stable; in this scenario, such a society will not be able to fully develop (GSPDM, 2017). In more recent conflicts, this distinction for the military has become unclear; the transition between warfighting to stability operations is generally not mutually exclusive.

Figure 2, highlights a framework used in the Filipino Military where the relationship of these elements is critical for the well-being of Society. When balanced, development can often reduce security risks; generally, if the catalyst for conflict is social/economic in nature. When Governance sits outside of this, then no amount of development or security will create a healthy “State” of well-being (GSPDM, 2017; Van Avery, 2007). When intervention for humanitarian assistance in emergencies which require security or assets on the ground arises; does calling on help from western-militaries then create an unbearable risk; or can they be accepted/mitigated sufficiently?

Subsequently, with time and space a significant consideration, the humanitarian imperative must be measured against the humanitarian principles, but how is such an interaction quantified and when should this option be used? Guidelines do exist for quantifying this relationship, but the point here, is that NGOs often do not have the logistical chains or assets, readily available to restore the necessities of society, or simply operate in some of the most complex topographical and political regions. With non-state actors playing a significant part in current crises, and the instrumentalisation of donorship affecting funding; the lines of communication to request and access resources also becomes increasingly complicated.

Benefits of Interaction

In very complex political-environments, there are tasks, in which the military can play a significant role. These are summarised in Table 2 below:​

When the requirement of tasks is in alignment with the needs of the beneficiary, then the role of the military is extended from an enabling of the environment for which these humanitarian activities can occur. Yet, challenges in coordination is not the only issue that can arise from such collaboration; this interaction increases the vulnerability of humanitarian organisations to a myriad of threats.

Disadvantages of Cooperation

Disadvantages exist in any large organisation, often in terms of coordination/logistics; this context however, is particularly significant across three specific areas, summarised in Figure 3. The misalignment in organisation can play a significant role, in the quality of outcomes, but the other areas, are conceptual and ultimately, harder to control (Herman, 2017).

Case Study: Iraq

The conflict in Iraq has highlighted the evolution and complexity of these threats, which will likely become more common in the future (Van Avery, 2007). The need for a National Response Plan has become critical for almost every organisation operating in the country (OCHA, 2017). The key differences in Iraq, in comparison to other past conflicts, are the perceptions of populations and the “mis-association” of humanitarian actors with the interests of external actors.

Past military experiences of the Iraqi people for example, have likely influenced this, and in an environment where war is waged on philosophy and theology rather than resources, the polarity in association becomes clear; to put it simply, “it’s them or us” (Chandler, 2004; Gillan, 2004). A jihad, ultimately can and will transcend the physical borders and resources; and thus, the threat that such an association can have on international forces increases (Abiew 2003a; 2003b). The bombing of the Canan-Hotel in Baghdad (2003), was such an example; where the UN headquarters was targeted by a truck-bomb killing 23 people. 600 UN Staff-members were withdrawn after the attack, halting the work of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (OCHA, 2017).

No longer was the emblem of the UN a global sign for protection, but now it had become a target for all jihadists operating within Iraq. al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab Zarqawi, had targeted Sergio Vieira de Mello and the headquarters for his part in giving East-Timor sovereignty and removing territory away from the Indonesian “Caliphate” under Western Intervention led by Australia (Muir, 2017; OCHA, 2017). When such a motivation exists, it becomes distinctly clear, that western militaries and the instrumentalisation of them (even from the past), can influence the security environment significantly, regardless of steps taken to stay impartial or neutral.

Framework for Interaction

With the backdrop of this changing nature in conflict, the proliferation of various actors in the field and the knowledge that conflict leads to an increasingly longer commitment for States; it becomes increasingly difficult to predict a likely outcome for any intervention.

Such a scenario, will likely increase pressure on governments to increase collaboration in complex-emergencies to ensure the protection of humanitarian actors. Therefore, Civil-Military Coordination is critical in establishing this environment within the humanitarian space. The criticality lies in interaction, and the considerations when assistance is required. In the UN-CMCoord handbook, the process prior to any collaboration is conceptually shown in figure 4:​

Figure 5 below, shows an example that is largely used for NGOs and UN Agencies, in CMCoord; it is clear, that security plays a significant role, therefore with each clear distinction in security phases, military interaction should change.

​This framework, is appropriate for a region like the Pacific, partly due to the political-stability, lack of religious influence and the secularity of many Pacific-States. Yet other environments, often have significantly more complex stakeholder-relationships, which ultimately affect the ability of humanitarians collaborating with western militaries. Technical frameworks such as the Oslo, MCDA guidelines are important in determining the use of military assets. However, the blurring of lines in areas of humanitarian assistance ultimately has a significant effect on leaders working towards the needs of the beneficiary (Schloms, 2003; Reiterer, 2015).

In areas with greater cultural sensitivities, or religious/ethnic minorities; incorrect perception of western-influence and a poor understanding of the local environment can and will impair the relationships of beneficiaries with international actors. The UN-CMCoord Handbook identifies the need for “Country-Specific Guidance”, yet the extent and comprehensiveness of such an analysis is not defined. Outputs such as SWOT and Stakeholder matrices are important tools, yet these are conducted by a single Officer. Such complex cultural assessments, should be done at an exceptionally thorough analytical level, with contingency planning-processes in place to identify all courses of action.

Militaries globally have invested heavily in training/development, but this is generally classified or not available to the public. There are country specific checklists that are used to help assessment teams identify these relationship links, but this is poorly defined and not readily available in existing literature.

Conclusion

The instrumentalisation of militaries to accomplish State interests, will always be a consideration when implementing humanitarian assistance. However, in an environment where the beneficiary’s needs are significant, the specific advantages that CIMIC can bring will often outweigh any risk. Humanitarian organisations already have existing frameworks to structure their relationships with military actors in various emergencies; but now with the proliferation of non-state/theological actors, the number of considerations increases.

Therefore, risk mitigation procedures suitable for the cultural situation, needs to be analysed and implemented; with a suitable response plan in place should these threats become real. UN-CMCoord is a critical component of intervention, but any collaboration with “instruments” of different States needs to be analysed heavily. Personal experience not only highlights the inflexibility of the military’s organisational structure, but the general rhetoric within the military often is supportive of State foreign policies, with more conservative discourses/views of the world. When operating with the humanitarian imperative, this misalignment is detrimental, especially when in conflict with the political views of indigenous peoples.

More research in the cultural assessment of the mission environment must occur, the Canan-Hotel bombing highlighted the misalignment in the three key areas of perception, motivation and organisation; demonstrating the growing risks that humanitarian actors face throughout the world.

References

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